讲座:Does managerial stock option compensation increase shareholder value in state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong?

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题目:Does managerial stock option compensation increase shareholder value in state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong?

报告人:Bin Ke

主办单位:会计系

时间:2010123日(星期五)上午9:30

地点:法华校区安泰楼102

报告人简介:Bin Ke1994年获美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学硕士学位,1999年获美国密歇根州立大学博士学位。研究兴趣涉及会计信息、投资者行为、市场有效性、管理者薪酬、公司治理、税收与公司战略等多个领域。2004年至今担任The Accounting Review杂志编委会成员,并在Journal of Accounting and EconomicsThe Accounting Review等国际顶尖期刊上发表多篇文章。

报告简介:

We test the effect of managerial stock option compensation on shareholder value in state-controlled Chinese firms that are incorporated outside China and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The grant and exercise of stock options differ significantly between Chinese firms and U.S. firms. The common shareholder value maximizing economic factors cannot explain Chinese firms’ stock option grant initiation. The stock market reactions to announcements of stock option scheme proposals are insignificant. There is no improvement in earnings performance after the stock option grant. We conclude that Chinese firms’ stock option compensation does not increase shareholder value

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