讲座: Political ties and financial reporting quality in the transitional economy of China: Evidence on loss recognition timeliness

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题目:Political ties and financial reporting quality in the transitional economy of China: Evidence on loss recognition timeliness

报告人:陈世敏 教授(Shimin Chen

主持人:陈亚民 教授 上海交通大学管理学院会计系主任

时间:2010414日(周三)下午13:3015:30

地点:法华校区北楼104

报告人简介:

陈世敏,中欧国际工商学院会计学教授,上海财经大学及南京大学的做客教授。此前,他担任香港理工大学会计及金融学院的副院长及副教授。陈教授本科毕业于上海财经大学,1992年获得了乔治亚大学博士学位,之后便执教于宾州克莱瑞恩大学、香港岭南大学及路易斯安那大学拉斐特分校。他的研究兴趣涉及基于会计研究的资本市场、管理控制系统以及中国的会计和财务报告等领域。他曾经在高质量的国际期刊上发表了很多文章,包括:《The Accounting Review》;《Journal of Accounting,Auditing and Finance,Auditing A Journal of Practice and Theory,Accounting Horizon,Behavioral Research in Accounting,Accounting and Business Research,The International Journal of Accounting,Journal of International Accounting Research》等。此外,陈教授还担任《中国会计与财务研究》的责任编辑及《China Journal of Accounting Research》的副主编。

内容简介

This study examines how political connections influence financial reporting quality measured as the timeliness of loss recognition. We propose and test the proposition that government intervention via top managers with political ties changes the incentives of financial reporting and motivates politically connected SOEs in China to adopt less conservative accounting practice. Based on a sample of non-financial A-share firms from 2001 to 2006, we find that political connections reduce conservatism only in SOEs that are controlled by local governments, but not in SOEs that are controlled by the central government or firms that are owned by private entities. This is consistent with more intervention in SOEs by local government bureaucrats for their self-interests or fundamentally different incentives of non-SOEs in establishing political connections. We further show that the negative effect of political connections on timely loss recognition is mainly observed in regions with better economic conditions such as lower unemployment rate and fiscal deficit or higher GDP per capita. This indicates that the incentives to intervene and thus the effects on conservatism are stronger in rich regions where controlling governments are better able to acquire resources from well-performing SOEs to support their political agenda. We therefore conclude that, by shaping the incentives of SOEs, government intervention via politically connected top executives significantly lowers financial reporting conservatism.

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